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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper discusses the often-overlooked topic of the profound philosophical influence 
which Russian Orthodoxy has historically had on Russian culture and, as a result, on 
Russia’s behaviour in foreign affairs. In particular, I highlight the three main trends 
which appear to continue between the early Tsarist and Soviet periods—namely, the idea 
of Russia’s ‘special mission’ in the world, messianism and millenarianism. 
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‘HOLY RUSSIA’: THE CULTURAL INFLUENCES OF ORTHODOXY ON RUSSIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 
 
And let it be known to Thy Lordship, O Pious Czar… 
that though art the sole Emperor of all Christians in  
the whole universe…For two Romes have fallen, and  
the Third stands, and a fourth shall never be, for Thy  
Christian Empire shall never devolve upon others.i 
-Monk Filofei 
 
The history of Christian Russia is conventionally set to begin circa 988 C. E., when Prince Vladimir of Kiev 
converted to Orthodoxy. Since that time, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has occupied a central role in the 
creation of a coherent Russian national identity. In the field of foreign policy, it has long been observed that the 
‘least developed angle of analysis…is the study of how societal culture affects foreign policy choice.’ii Seldom 
explored, in the case of Russia, has been the influential role which Orthodoxy has played in the country’s 
relations with the outside world.iii We are here concerned with the philosophical impact of the Church’s 
teachings on Russian foreign policy, as opposed to the direct role of the institution itself, unless otherwise 
specified. This paper will discuss the three main characteristics which Russia’s foreign policy-making inherited 
from the Orthodox Christian tradition, namely the myth of Russia’s ‘special mission,’ messianism and 
millenarianism. In a broad historical sweep, we will highlight these phenomena in action from the early 
formation of Russian statehood, through to the imperial and, finally, Soviet period. We will finish by discussing 
the extent to which Orthodoxy impacts upon the foreign policies of the Russian Federation to this day. 
 
THIRD ROME AND NEW ISRAEL 
 
By the late Sixteenth Century, Russia was finally freeing herself from the Tatar Yoke. As an already 600-year 
old Russian institution, the ROC served as a rallying point in this era of chaotic nation-building. In popular 
culture, Orthodoxy also helped to distinguish the Slavic East from the European West.iv Due to its historical role 
as a struggling Christian bulwark against the Tatars, Russia ‘became the self-conscious champion of 
orthodoxy.’v  As a result, the Kremlin’s position in foreign affairs was profoundly influenced by the religious 
peculiarities of the Church. To begin, the narrative of Russians’ spiritual uniqueness in the world was the most 
obvious outgrowth of ROC teachings. Russia, it was deemed, had a unique place in world history as the ‘Third 
and Last Rome’; the guardian of the one ‘true faith’ (pravoslavno); the land of God’s Chosen People. One 
offshoot of the ROC even considered Russia to be ‘the New Israel’ and, as such, the new Kingdom of God.vi  
 
At this stage, it should be noted that the belief of one’s people being ‘a vessel chosen by a deity for a special 
religious task or mission’ seems to be a universal feature of nationalism.vii Russia is certainly not alone in the 
religious undertones which its foreign policy attained. As an historical phenomenon, nationalism worldwide has 
always had ‘a strong affinity with religious imaginings.’viii The classic counter-example to Russian messianism 
has not been lost on historians—that is America’s penchant towards a sense of exceptionalism and evangelical 
“Manifest Destiny” in the world.ix However, Orthodoxy was particularly influential to the development of 
Russia’s national identity and, as a result, of Russian patterns in world affairs. By the Nineteenth Century, no 
other European nationalism ‘approached the messianic fervour, the Sendungsbewusstsein, the expectation of a 
decisive apocalyptic struggle against the alien world,’ that such Russian authors as Fyodor Dostoyevsky and 
Nikolai Danilevsky propounded.x All of these ideological convictions, which shaped Russian behaviour in the 
international realm for centuries, in fact descended from the spiritual and philosophical guidance of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. 
 
RUSSIAN MESSIANISM: ‘TODAY YOU WILL BE WITH ME IN PARADISE’xi  
 
The Orthodox idea of Russia’s special role in the world eventually impacted directly upon Tsarist foreign 
policies. Gradually, the state adopted a messianic identity—a kind of outward-looking, evangelising role which 
the Russian government undertook, in the name of Orthodoxy and civilisation. What has been termed ‘organic 
colonialism’ towards the Siberian Far East was thus the Russian empire’s version of a God-sanctioned mission 
civilisatrice.xii Indeed, the Orthodox faith acted as a national glue between the multi-ethnic periphery and the 
imperial centre (Moscow).xiii Eventually, this intoxicating worldview came to be shared widely by Russia’s 
rulers. Tsarist officials insisted that their colonial subjects in Central Asia, and elsewhere, regarded the Russian 
presence there as ‘akin to paradise’.xiv Similarly, Alexander II believed in Holy Russia’s ‘sacred mission’ to 
liberate fellow Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.xv Hence, the messianic role which Russian Orthodoxy 
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imbued in the country’s populace, and then leaders, often had far-reaching consequences in Russia’s relations 
with the outside world. 
 
The official Russian explanation for participating in the Great Northern War was initially to defend Orthodoxy 
from Swedish persecution.xvi After defeating Sweden, though, the territorial gains bestowed upon Russia with 
the Treaty of Nystad (1721) strongly suggest that geopolitical interests had been the primary purpose of the 
war.xvii One author argues that the myth of Orthodox fraternity has historically served (and continues to serve) 
as a cynical Realpolitik tactic for Russian leaders who fear Western meddling in their backyard.xviii On one level 
this is true. Upon the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853, for example, a foreign eyewitness described how 
Russian villagers were motivated to go to war. They ‘have been led to believe that their religion is in danger,’ 
he recounted, ‘and that the Turks are massacring the [Orthodox] Greeks in all directions.’xix Thus Orthodoxy 
was so deeply imbedded in Russian culture, that, in this case, only propaganda playing on an existential threat 
to their religious brothers and sisters could awaken Russian war fervour. Rather than being simply understood 
as a manipulative ploy, this is, instead, a testament to how passionately Russians felt about their Orthodox faith 
that they should volunteer to die defending it. Indeed, Orthodoxy became so important in the make-up of 
Russia’s national identity, that peasants would often ask a stranger if they were Orthodox, which was 
synonymous for ‘Are you Russian?’ xx  
 
This worldview of messianism, reflected in Russian imperial and, later, Soviet foreign policy, could be referred 
to as the “outward-looking” face of Orthodoxy in Russia’s foreign affairs. These doctrines helped to shape 
Russia’s image—and nothing more than an image it was —as a messianic and philanthropic force of Christian 
progress in the world. Until 1917, this Christian messianism at least heralded a sense of normality in Russia’s 
diplomatic relations within the Europe-centric international system, dominated by other colonial and messianic 
powers. In stark contrast to the aforementioned tradition, however, the “inward-looking” face of Orthodoxy also 
found its way into Russia’s conduct of foreign affairs. This consisted, chiefly, of millenarianism—a belief in the 
imminent end of the world, which would usher in a thousand-year period of bliss on earth (the Millenium). It is 
this second under-current of Orthodox belief which differentiated Russia from Western states and, ultimately, 
cast the former as a pariah in world politics for most of the Twentieth Century.  
 
MILLENARIANISM: THE END IS NIGH 
 
Since the founding of the modern Russian state, the ‘prevalent belief that Russia was the centre of the only true 
faith, tended to intensify suspicion of foreigners and their institutions.’xxi It was feared, especially by the so-
called ‘Slavophiles,’ that Russia’s religious purity would be contaminated by ‘the spiritual sickness of the 
West’.xxii Due to its Russo-centric focus, the Orthodox Church became a political ally and, soon enough, the 
thinly veiled agent of the Muscovite state. This was demonstrated in the late Tsarist period, for example, when 
priests habitually denounced the political misbehaviour of their flock to the authorities.xxiii As a result of these 
trends, the Russian Church became ‘confined to its national boundaries, which, in turn, led to reinforcement of 
its state and political attributes.’xxiv This impacted Russian culture by inextricably entwining the political with 
the religious elements of social life. 
 
Russia’s international behaviour has been influenced by the kind of withdrawn and, in the extreme, xenophobic 
worldview which some teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church emphasised.xxv In particular, the mystical 
Orthodox value of sobornost,’ variously translated as ‘churchliness’ or ‘togetherness,’ implied a special 
communitarian function for the Church in Russian society. The principle of sobornost’ subordinates the 
individual to the collective, rejecting the Western concept of rational inquiry, and putting ultimate authority in 
the hands of the Church.xxvi Millenarianism, or a belief in the imminence of the Day of Judgement, is firmly 
rooted in this tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church—particularly the ‘Old Believer’ group. Their profound 
spiritual reclusiveness can best be understood through famous poetic lines by Fedor Tiutchev, in which he 
instructs: ‘Be silent, conceal yourself, and hide both your feelings and your dreams…Only learn to live within 
yourself.’xxvii Just as the apocalyptic visions of the Old Believers simmered in their lonesome contemplation, the 
Russian Orthodox tendency to look inwards for answers to the soul’s mysteries sometimes culminated in a 
black-and-white view of the outside world. 
 
FROM THE PRIESTHOOD TO THE PARTY 
 
Of all events in modern Russian history, the Civil War of the 1920s most resembled the end of the world for 
ordinary people.xxviii In these times when survival mattered above all, the general Russian worldview was 
simplified to one of good versus evil. As Geoffrey Hosking observed: 
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People thought in cruder ways. When reverses happened, they did not seek a sophisticated explanation, 
but took the one which…their political superiors usually encouraged: namely that misfortunes were 
caused by “enemies” who should be resisted at all costs and if possible destroyed, while good fortune 
was due to “comrades” who should be supported wholeheartedly. Such interpretations…shaped the 
Russian mentality for much of the twentieth century.xxix 
 
The Russian cultural pattern of withdrawal into oneself, as we have seen, was influenced by Orthodoxy and 
reinforced in the popular mind by the sufferings of the Russian people throughout history. A paranoid 
defensiveness from the outside world was the result for the Kremlin’s foreign policy, which reached its zenith in 
the early Soviet period. It could indeed be argued that the conditions for militant Marxism to succeed in Russia, 
as opposed to anywhere else in Europe, were contingent on the pre-existing messianic and millenarian traditions 
of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
 
The millenarian and, specifically, Orthodox overtones of Marxist-Leninist doctrines are an historical irony that 
escaped many of its atheistic followers. There was the prevalent belief in an inevitable world-wide revolution, 
for example, which would pit the forces of good (the proletariat) against the evil scourge of the earth (the 
capitalists) in a final, apocalyptic battle. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks combined the messianic and millenarian 
aspects of Russian Orthodoxy to shape a foreign policy at once dangerously confrontational—aimed at 
exporting revolution to destroy the very fabric of the international system—yet insecure and profoundly fearful 
of ‘capitalist encirclement’.xxx In the case of Josef Stalin, it could be objected that he himself was a chauvinistic 
xenophobe and, as such, that his foreign policy was less a reflection of Russian Orthodox influences than of his 
personal insecurity.xxxi However Stalin, who had attended a religious seminary in his youth, was without a doubt 
‘a child of the Russian Revolution with its apocalyptic belief in the catastrophic destruction of the old world in 
purifying flames and the emergence of a new millennium.’xxxii Stalin was, in other words, the combined product 
of his main politico-religious influences—namely Marxist-Leninism as well as Russian Orthodoxy. 
 
CONCLUSION: RETURNING TO, OR ABANDONING GOD? 
 
In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, it seemed self-evident that the new Russian state would be of a post-
ideological and, by extension, post-messianic character. An ideational crisis consumed Russian society, 
resulting from the dramatic exit of Soviet ‘secular messianism’ from the domestic and world stages.xxxiii 
However, this vacuum was partly filled by a popular revival of the Russian Orthodox Church. As of 2007, as 
many as 72 percent of Russian citizens identified themselves as Russian Orthodox, and a huge majority (92 
percent) claimed to believe in God.xxxiv Public debate about the direction of Russia in foreign affairs similarly 
revolved around the idea that the country ‘is endowed with a special world mission, which is spiritual par 
excellence.’xxxv In the words of a contemporary Orthodox Metropolitan, Russia was historically and is 
(allegedly) still ‘the pedestal of the Lord’s throne.’xxxvi This demonstrates that the philosophical influence of 
Orthodoxy, which had become indelibly etched on successive Russian generations, had not disappeared after 
one lifetime of Communist atheism and religious persecution. Metaphorically-speaking, God was not dead. This 
simple observation has important repercussions for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation today. 
 
In 2002, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov claimed that ‘Russia has consciously given up the global Messianic 
ideology that had been intrinsic to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)…’xxxvii Despite such 
efforts to stress that Russia was now a “normal” and pragmatic state in its international affairs, some echoes of 
the past have continued to resonate in Russian foreign policy. In rhetoric, at least, there is something distinctly 
messianic about the worldview of former-President Vladimir Putin. His much-touted concept of Russian 
derzhavnost’ (greatness) in world affairs is a case in point. ‘Russia was and will remain a great power,’ Putin 
wrote in his aptly-named Millenium Manifesto.xxxviii Furthermore, the influential school of thought of 
‘Eurasianism’ advocates a doctrinally-pure version of Orthodoxy and nationalism at home, accompanied by a 
renewed messianic and anti-Western stance in foreign affairs.xxxix  
 
In conclusion, the influence of Orthodoxy on Russia’s external relations in the Twenty-First Century is largely 
symbolic. The extremes of Russian messianism and millenarianism witnessed by the outside world, from the 
days of imperial to Soviet foreign policy, are well and truly over. The Russian Federation’s foreign policy is 
likely to remain messianic in rhetoric, at times, but not in essence.xl In the government’s pursuit of its perceived 
national interests, as many analysts concur, ‘Russia sees little utility in messianic efforts.’xli In sum, the Russian 
Orthodox Church certainly remains an important source of national unity and spiritual guidance in Russian 
society, but it no longer excises a strong, philosophical influence in Moscow’s inter-state relations. 
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